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I.

INTRODUCING THE OTHER MARRIAGE EQUALITY PROBLEM

What is “the other marriage equality problem”? A helpful point of departure
for answering this question is a July 15, 2012, front-page story in the New York
Times entitled Two Classes, Divided by ‘I Do’ and accompanied by the
explanatory sub-caption: “Marriage, for Richer; Single Motherhood, for
Poorer.”1 This lengthy article by Jason DeParle contrasted the lives of two
“friendly white women from modest Midwestern backgrounds who left for
college with conventional hopes of marriage, motherhood and career.”2 Jessica
Schairer, a single mother who left college after becoming pregnant and
cohabited with, but did not marry, her children’s now-absent father, bears
alone “the challenges and responsibilities of raising three children.”3 Jessica is
an employee of a married mother of two, Chris Faulkner, who “did standard
things in standard order: high school, college, marriage and children.”4 DeParle
asserts that what most separates these two women are not things like “the
impact of globalization on their wages but a 6-foot-8-inch man named Kevin,”
Chris’s husband.5 Chris and Kevin have “strength in numbers”: two incomes
yield more resources and two parents yield more time for actively engaging in
parenting and the extracurricular activities that “can enhance academic
performance.”6 Using this portrait of two women’s lives to sound a cautionary
note about family inequality, DeParle draws on sociologist Sara McLanahan’s
warning (sounded in 2004) “that family structure increasingly consigns
children to ‘diverging destinies.’”7
The article doubtlessly secured its prime spot on the front page of the
Sunday New York Times with the news that it is “white women with some
postsecondary schooling but not a full college degree” who account for the
greatest increase in non-marital births and single-parent households.8 The
article caught my eye in part because its author, Jason DeParle, penned so
many significant news stories during the protracted Congressional debates over
welfare reform in the mid-1990s9 and, more recently, wrote an acclaimed book
1

Jason DeParle, Two Classes, Divided by ‘I Do,’ N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2012, at A1.
Id.
3 Id.
4 Id.
5 Id.
6 Id. (stressing Kevin’s involvement in the Boy Scouts and his sons’ other activities).
7 Id. (quoting Sara McLanahan, Diverging Destinies: How Children Are Faring Under
the Second Demographic Transition, 41 DEMOGRAPHY 607 (2004)).
8 Id.
9 See, e.g., Jason DeParle, Get to Work; the New Contract with America’s Poor, N.Y.
TIMES, July 28, 1996, § 4, at 1; Jason DeParle, Sharp Increase Along the Borders of Poverty,
N.Y. TIMES, March 31, 1994, at A18.
2
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about the impact of welfare reform on three African American women in an
extended family.10 It also reminded me of the warnings sounded by Charles
Murray during those welfare debates in his provocative Wall Street Journal
article, The Coming White Underclass.11 Indeed, DeParle’s article even
mentions Murray’s newest book, Coming Apart: The State of White America,
1960-2010.12
DeParle’s story, which warns that family inequality is growing and that
wealth separates the married from the unmarried, also drew my attention
because it contrasted sharply with another type of media story about the future
of marriage. Several months earlier, in January 2012, a vivacious and smiling
woman graced the cover of Boston magazine in the story Single by Choice.13
The article’s caption read: “This is Terri. She’s successful, happy, and at 38,
just fine with never getting married. Ever.”14 The synopsis of the story read:
When it comes to getting hitched, more Americans than ever before are
saying “I don’t.” Singles now make up nearly half the adult population in
this country, and new research suggests they’re happier, more social, and
more active in the community than many of their wedded counterparts.
Now if only their friends and family (oh, and while we’re at it,
coworkers, benefits providers, and the federal government) would get off
their back.15
The magazine story profiled several happy women living seemingly full and
fun lives, including Alice Stern, a fifty-two-year-old “‘spinner’” – not, she
“defiantly” says, a “spinster” – who is planning a “knitting cruise to Nova
Scotia” with her knitting friends.16 The various researchers surveyed confirmed
that it is time to “rethink singledom” as simply a “stop on the way toward the
happy ending,” and to stop emphasizing “the value of the marital bond above
all others” and viewing marriage as a unique pillar of civil society.17 When
“more of us than ever before are going it alone” – by choice, the story
admonishes – it is time to question the cultural messages that tell us that
“happiness and success come through our partnerships.”18
10 See generally JASON DEPARLE, AMERICAN DREAM: THREE WOMEN, TEN KIDS, AND A
NATION’S DRIVE TO END WELFARE (2004).
11 Charles Murray, The Coming White Underclass, WALL ST. J., Oct. 29, 1993, at A14. I
have written at length elsewhere about Murray’s article and the 1990s debates over welfare
reform. See Linda C. McClain, “Irresponsible” Reproduction, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 339
(1996).
12 DeParle, supra note 1 (citing CHARLES MURRAY, COMING APART: THE STATE OF
WHITE AMERICA, 1960-2010 (2012)).
13 Janelle Nanos, Single by Choice, BOSTON, Jan. 2012, at 46.
14 Id. (caption appearing on the magazine’s cover).
15 Id. at 46.
16 Id. at 51.
17 Id. at 50, 78, 80.
18 Id. at 49.

924

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 93:921

These two contrasting stories about what is happening to marriage invite
attention to the “other marriage equality problem.” To examine that problem, I
will use two recent books as foils, Hanna Rosin’s The End of Men: And the
Rise of Women19 (the anchor for this Symposium) and Charles Murray’s
Coming Apart.20 By using the phrase, the “other marriage equality problem,” I
mean to invite attention to issues about marital equality and inequality beyond
that of gay men and lesbians’ access to the institution of civil marriage. That
marriage equality problem is one, in my view, of basic fairness, justice, and
rights, and I have written in support of such equality.21 In this Article,
however, my concern is with the marriage equality problem that is captured in
warnings about the growing class-based marriage divide and the “diverging
destinies” of children that flow from these emerging patterns of family life.22
Sara McLanahan and Christine Percheski powerfully capture this concern over
the impact of class-based marriage inequality upon children with the phrase
“the reproduction of inequalities.”23 Other scholars refer to the
“intergenerational transmission” of advantage and disadvantage.24 Because
Rosin’s and Murray’s books both address the class-based marriage divide,
evaluating their books in tandem with one another, while also acknowledging
their differences and limitations, helps to examine this other marriage equality
problem. Murray’s book deliberately focuses on the fate of a growing slice of
“white America” to provide evidence that America is “coming apart at the
seams . . . of class.”25 Rosin’s book does not explicitly articulate such a focus,
but the men and women she profiles appear to be primarily white.26 Moreover,
she draws explicit parallels between the so-called “new American matriarchy”
flowing from men’s job loss in the middle class and the prior emergence of a
“virtual matriarchy” in poor black communities due to black men’s loss of
factory jobs.27 By comparison, the literature on the growing class divide in
family forms, which I also discuss in this Article, is more inclusive and does
19

HANNA ROSIN, THE END OF MEN: AND THE RISE OF WOMEN (2012).
MURRAY, supra note 12.
21 See, e.g., JAMES E. FLEMING & LINDA C. MCCLAIN, ORDERED LIBERTY: RIGHTS,
RESPONSIBILITIES, AND VIRTUES 177-236 (2013); LINDA C. MCCLAIN, THE PLACE OF
FAMILIES: FOSTERING CAPACITY, EQUALITY, AND RESPONSIBILITY 155-90 (2006).
22 See McLanahan, supra note 7, at 614-15.
23 Sara McLanahan & Christine Percheski, Family Structure and the Reproduction of
Inequalities, 34 ANN. REV. SOC. 257 (2008).
24 See Molly A. Martin, Family Structure and the Intergenerational Transmission of
Educational Advantage, 41 SOC. SCI. RES. 33 (2012).
25 MURRAY, supra note 12, at 12-13.
26 See, e.g., ROSIN, supra note 19, at 70-88.
27 Id. at 88. In discussing men’s unemployment problems in Alexander City, Alabama,
Rosin states that “[t]his script has played out once before in American culture,” referring to
the exodus of black men from factory jobs, beginning in the 1970s, and the negative
consequences for nuclear families and social institutions. Id. (citing WILLIAM JULIUS
WILSON, WHEN WORK DISAPPEARS: THE WORLD OF THE NEW URBAN POOR (1996)).
20
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not suggest, as Murray’s work seems to, that the marriage equality problem
only warrants concern when it affects white Americans.28
Warnings about growing family inequality and the “intergenerational
transmission” or “reproduction” of that inequality warrant attention. We should
care about the relationship between the family and the polity, as well as the
role of civil society, more generally, in generating and sustaining the American
experiment in “ordered liberty.”29 The urgent tone of Murray’s book stems in
part from his concern about a class-based falling away among “white America”
from the nation’s “founding virtues,” including the “bedrock” role of marriage
in sustaining society.30 Although Rosin does not speak the language of civil
society or of founding virtues, the portraits of modern relationships that she
offers to illustrate that “[o]ur nation is splitting into two divergent societies,
each with their own particular marriage patterns,” offer glimmerings of the toll
the growing marriage divide takes on communities and families.31 In our
political and constitutional order, families are a crucial place of social
reproduction. They nurture children and prepare them for capable and
responsible lives as good persons and good citizens.32 As I argue elsewhere,
families share responsibility with other institutions of civil society and with
government in a “formative project” of fostering the capacity for personal and
democratic self-government.33 This formative project includes fostering the
healthy development of and protecting children as “immature citizens” and
preparing them for eventual full participation and cooperation as members of
their communities and the polity.34
At the same time, the Single by Choice story poses a different challenge to
the place of marriage in society by asking: Who needs marriage? Who says
that a stable, well-ordered society needs most people to marry? What if the
unmarried – the single by choice – can and do contribute to civil society and
civic virtue, perhaps even to a greater extent than the married?35 Moreover,
28 To be fair to Murray, although his book focuses on whites as a means of making his
case that the trends he warns about “exist independently of ethnic heritage,” he does include
a chapter near the end where he attempts to “broaden the picture to include everyone.”
MURRAY, supra 12, at 13, 269-77.
29 On this relationship, see FLEMING & MCCLAIN, supra note 21, at 81-111; MARY ANN
GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE 115-17 (1991);
and MCCLAIN, supra note 21, at 50-56.
30 MURRAY, supra note 12, at 134, 270-72.
31 See, e.g., ROSIN, supra note 19, at 79-112.
32 See generally MCCLAIN, supra note 21.
33 Id. at 4-11.
34 See FLEMING & MCCLAIN, supra note 21, at 118-45; MCCLAIN, supra note 21, at 6468. For the term “immature citizens,” see Vivian E. Hamilton, Immature Citizens and the
State, 2010 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1055.
35 See Nanos, supra note 13, at 78 (referencing sociologist Eric Klinenberg’s view that
single people “have social capital in spades”); id. (reporting that “it’s actually married
people who have become increasingly isolated,” which has “resulted in a ‘short-circuiting of
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what if those affluent and successful Americans who remain single by choice
also remain childless? If not only marriage but also parenthood are rejected by
more and more of the most successful, then what happens to the literal
reproduction on which society depends and to the social reproduction of those
virtues, skills, and traits of character that support self-government in a
constitutional democracy? The “who needs marriage” story, however,
ultimately seems in tension with the marriage inequality story: the latter
stresses that marriage, and parenting within marriage, are increasingly matters
of class privilege, while the former casts doubt on the place of marriage, and
children, in the lives of the more affluent.
This Article also examines the relevance of gender roles and gender equality
to the other marriage equality problem. This equality issue is not about equality
among families and between generations, but about equality within marriage
and between unmarried men and women. This gender dimension is evident in
Rosin’s vignettes of contemporary “upended gender dynamics” on both sides
of the marriage divide.36 The elite, she contends, negotiate the “seesaw
marriage,” while the less affluent contend with “the new American matriarchy”
among the married and unmarried alike.37 This gender analysis, however
imperfect, is one of the most intriguing parts of her exposition of the “end of
men.”
Gender dynamics are also a focus of Murray’s book. Notably, both Murray
and Rosin suggest that a basic problem with respect to the growing marriage
divide lies in male irresponsibility.38 To be sure, Rosin is more attentive to
structural and economic factors affecting men than Murray, who stresses men’s
falling away from the founding virtues.39 Working within a heterosexual
frame, their work presents the following questions: When economic and social
factors force a change in roles within the family and the workplace, how do
men and women cope? If women and men aspire to an egalitarian marriage,
how well does that work? Are men ready for such equality? Are women?
McLanahan’s thesis about “diverging destinies” is instructive on such gender
dynamics since she identified class-based differences not only in men’s and
women’s relative bargaining power in intimate relationships but also in the
belief in and availability of egalitarian marriage.40
In Part II my exposition of the other marriage equality problem begins with
McLanahan’s diagnosis of the “diverging destinies” of children as class

community ties’ within contemporary society” (quoting NATALIA SARKISIAN & NAOMI
GERSTEL, NUCLEAR FAMILY VALUES, EXTENDED FAMILY LIVES: THE POWER OF RACE,
CLASS, AND GENDER 40 (2012))).
36 ROSIN, supra note 19, at 91.
37 See id. at 47-77, 79-112.
38 MURRAY, supra note 12, at 155-56, 216; ROSIN, supra note 19, at 91.
39 Compare ROSIN, supra note 19, at 8-10, with MURRAY, supra note 12, at 134-37.
40 See McLanahan, supra note 7. I undertake a discussion of these gender dynamics infra
Part II.A.
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disparities widen. I then look back to the late 1990s and early 2000s to discuss
how the low rate of marriage among low-income parents, as well as an evident
gap between their marital aspirations and their marital practices – the same gap
detailed in the work by McLanahan and her colleagues on “fragile families” –
preoccupied federal lawmakers debating welfare reform and welfare
reauthorization. Recent studies, I then show, view “Middle America”41 as
increasingly part of the marriage “have nots,” individuals who fail to achieve
their marital aspirations and decouple parenthood from marriage. In Part III, I
examine how Rosin’s book and related writing present the marriage divide and
the related issue of gender dynamics. In Part IV, I turn to Murray’s analysis of
the gap between the “new upper class,” in which marriage and other founding
virtues remain intact and the “new lower class,” in which marriage is no longer
the norm. More so than Rosin, Murray addresses implications of the marriage
divide for children and society. I end the Article by offering some conclusions
about the other marriage equality problem.
II.

WHAT IS THE OTHER MARRIAGE EQUALITY PROBLEM AND WHY SHOULD
SOCIETY CARE?

In this Part I will explicate the other marriage equality problem. My primary
sources are Sara McLanahan’s influential 2004 article42 as well as other work
by McLanahan and her colleagues on the Fragile Families and Child Wellbeing
Study;43 a 2010 Pew Research Center report;44 and recent State of Our Unions
reports, produced by the National Marriage Project, which sound alarms about
the decline of marriage in Middle America and the rise of “fragile families.”45
My goal here is not to offer a thorough review of the extensive literature on
class and family formation. My co-panelists Naomi Cahn and June Carbone
41 For use of this term, see NAT’L MARRIAGE PROJECT & INST. FOR AM. VALUES, THE
STATE OF OUR UNIONS: MARRIAGE IN AMERICA 2012: THE PRESIDENT’S MARRIAGE AGENDA
(2012) [hereinafter STATE OF OUR UNIONS 2012]. This report describes “Middle America” as
“the nearly 60 percent of Americans aged 26 to 60 who have a high school but not a fouryear college degree.” Id. at 2.
42 See McLanahan, supra note 7.
43 See Christina M. Gibson-Davis et al., High Hopes but Even Higher Expectations: The
Retreat from Marriage Among Low-Income Couples, 67 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 1301 (2005).
See generally About the Fragile Families and Child Wellbeing Study, FRAGILE FAMILIES &
CHILD WELLBEING STUDY, http://www.fragilefamilies.princeton.edu/about.asp (last visited
May 12, 2013).
44 PEW RESEARCH CTR., THE DECLINE OF MARRIAGE AND RISE OF NEW FAMILIES (2010),
available at http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/files/2010/11/pew-social-trends-2010-families.
pdf.
45 STATE OF OUR UNIONS 2012, supra note 41, at xi-xiii; id. at 89-90 (discussing a
substantial decline in the “percentage of children under age 18 living with two married
parents”); NAT’L MARRIAGE PROJECT & INST. FOR AM. VALUES, THE STATE OF OUR UNIONS:
MARRIAGE IN AMERICA 2010: WHEN MARRIAGE DISAPPEARS: THE NEW MIDDLE AMERICA
(2010) [hereinafter STATE OF OUR UNIONS 2010].
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have done much to bring this topic (and literature) into family law and policy
discussions.46 Instead, I want to get the basic outline of the problem on the
table so readers will be able to consider Rosin’s and Murray’s analyses in light
of this sociological backdrop. One aim of my exposition is to show the
migration from a focus on the disappearance of marriage among low-income
parents to a concern that the marriage divide affects a growing swath of
Americans.
A.

Diverging Destinies and the Marriage Divide

One reason the class-based marriage-inequality problem garners such acute
attention is the impact the growing divide has on children. Thus, the subtitle of
McLanahan’s influential 2004 article explains whose destinies are diverging:
“How Children Are Faring Under the Second Demographic Transition.”47
McLanahan explains that the first demographic transition took place from the
early 1880s through the early 1900s, when “mortality and fertility declined and
investment in child quality grew” in western industrialized countries.48 Both
rich and poor children, she observes, benefited from this increased investment
in children. In the 1950s children “were more likely than those growing up 100
years earlier to live in traditional nuclear families, to be in good health, and to
attend school.”49 The second demographic transition, McLanahan explains,
“began around 1960” and includes such trends as “delays in fertility and
marriage; increases in cohabitation, divorce, and nonmarital childbearing; and
increases in maternal employment.”50 “How children are faring” under this
transition, she asserts, “is less certain,” since “[s]ome of these trends, like
delays in childbearing, imply gains in parental resources”; “others, like divorce
and nonmarital childbearing, imply losses”; and “others, like increased
maternal employment, suggest both.”51
One purpose of McLanahan’s article was to challenge the public’s
impression that it is “highly educated women” – like the television character
Murphy Brown, whom Vice President Dan Quayle criticized in 1992 for
becoming a single mother52 – who are driving “changes in family formation,”
46

See NAOMI CAHN & JUNE CARBONE, FAMILY CLASSES (forthcoming 2013) (on file with
author) [hereinafter CAHN & CARBONE, FAMILY CLASSES]; NAOMI CAHN & JUNE CARBONE,
RED FAMILIES V. BLUE FAMILIES: LEGAL POLARIZATION AND THE CREATION OF CULTURE 118
(2010) [hereinafter CAHN & CARBONE, RED FAMILIES V. BLUE FAMILIES] (“[T]he ability to
marry has become an even greater marker of class.”); June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, The
End of Men or the Rebirth of Class?, 93 B.U. L. REV. 871, 878-80 (2013).
47 McLanahan, supra note 7 (emphasis added).
48 Id. at 607.
49 Id.
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 See, e.g., Peter Johnson, Murphy No Role Model, USA TODAY, May 20, 1992, at 1A
(quoting Vice President Quayle: “It doesn’t help matters when primetime TV has Murphy
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such as the increased number of nonmarital births.53 Instead, she reports,
“college-educated women are more likely to marry than other women” and
“less likely to divorce.”54 As a result, “trends in marriage, divorce, and single
motherhood all contradict the argument that the most economically
independent women are choosing single motherhood over marriage.”55
McLanahan contends that “the forces that are driving the transition are leading
to two different trajectories – with different implications for children. One
trajectory – the one associated with delays in childbearing and increases in
maternal employment – reflects gains in resources, while the other – the one
associated with divorce and nonmarital childbearing – reflects losses.”56 These
differing trajectories lead to “widening social-class disparities in children’s
resources”: children born to “mothers from the most-advantaged backgrounds
are making substantial gains in resources,” while “children born to mothers
from the most disadvantaged backgrounds are making small gains and, in some
instances, even losing parental resources.”57
The comparative role of fathers is pertinent. Children of the most
advantaged mothers are “born into stable unions and are spending more time
with their fathers”; for those children born to the most disadvantaged mothers,
by comparison, “their parents’ relationships are unstable, and for many,
support from their biological father is minimal.”58 How does marriage factor
into this story? When researchers look at fathers, they find that “although
fathers’ involvement [with their children] has increased since 1965,”59 there
are contemporary gaps. Since the 1980s married college-educated fathers
spend the most time with their children as compared to (in order of decreasing
child-parent contact) unmarried college-educated fathers, married fathers who

Brown – a character who supposedly epitomizes today’s intelligent, highly paid,
professional woman – mocking the importance of fathers by bearing a child alone and
calling it just another lifestyle choice” (quotation marks omitted)). For more on Vice
President Quayle’s famous “Murphy Brown” speech and the political aftermath, including
the Vice President’s office subsequently praising Brown for showing “pro-life” and “strong
family values” because she did not terminate her pregnancy and describing single mothers
as “true heroes and inspirations,” see McClain, supra note 11, at 349-50, 396.
53 McLanahan, supra note 7, at 607-08.
54 Id. at 612 (emphasis omitted) (citing Joshua R. Goldstein & Catherine T. Kenney,
Marriage Delayed or Marriage Forgone? New Cohort Forecasts of First Marriage for U.S.
Women, 66 AM. SOC. REV. 506, 514 (2001); Steven P. Martin, Growing Evidence of a
Divorce Divide? Education and Marital Rates in the U.S. Since the 1970s, at 27 tbl.2 (2004)
(unpublished manuscript available at http://www.russellsage.org/sites/all/files/u4/Martin_Gr
owing%20Evidence%20for%20a%20Divorce%20Divide.pdf)).
55 Id.
56 Id. at 608.
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 Id. at 612.
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are not college-educated, and unmarried fathers who are not college
educated.60
McLanahan posits that second-wave feminism, namely its promotion of
“women’s independence and gender equality on multiple fronts,” was among
the causes of this second demographic transition.61 The changes that
McLanahan links to feminism warrant mention, given the relevance of these
changes to Rosin’s “end of men and rise of women” thesis, generally, and the
possibility of egalitarian marriage, in particular. Feminism “provided women
with an identity other than ‘wife’ and ‘mother’ and encouraged them to invest
in education and careers, criticized the gender-role specialization that was the
mainstay of traditional marriages and provided new standards for moreegalitarian marriages, and argued against the stigmatization of single
motherhood.”62 Feminism, as expressed in political activism, “fought gender
discrimination in the labor force and higher education and argued that
government should support women’s right to bear children and establish
independent households.”63 McLanahan also speculates that feminism made
college-educated men more “accepting of women’s demands for moreegalitarian marriages.”64
A familiar factor in the second demographic transition is women’s increased
ability to control their fertility, due to the pill and legalized abortion.65
Strikingly, McLanahan contends that these trends also have made it “easier for
men to shirk their paternal responsibilities,” a point that is also pertinent to
Murray’s argument. How so? “Before the pill a woman could not afford to
have sex with a man without obtaining a promise of marriage.”66 The pill
reduced the risk of unplanned pregnancy, a deterrent to nonmarital sex, making
it unnecessary for men to make such a promise in order to engage in
nonmarital sex.67 In addition, the increased number of women willing “to
engage in sexual relationships without a promise of marriage lowered the
bargaining power of women who wanted to marry and have children.”68 And
“social norms about the acceptability of single motherhood and women’s right
to an abortion” reinforced these “changes in bargaining power.”69 Conservative
theorists, it bears mentioning, speak about this shift in bargaining power in
terms of women’s decreasing ability or willingness to serve as the traditional
60

Id. at 612-14.
Id. at 617.
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 Id. (citing George A. Akerlof et al., An Analysis of Out-of-Wedlock Childbearing in
the United States, 111 Q.J. ECON. 277 (1996)).
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 Id.
61
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“gatekeepers of sexuality” and use sexual modesty and restraint to bring men
to marriage.70
Changes in labor market conditions are another factor in the demographic
transition, with implications for marriage, women’s choices, and male
“shirking.” McLanahan recounts the loss of jobs by low-skilled men during
various recessions, which made men “less ‘marriageable’ in the eyes of
women.”71 Growing wage inequality differentiated college-educated from high
school-educated men.72 These trends, as well as the narrowing of the gendered
wage gap, “provided strong incentives for women to get a college education
and enter the labor force.”73 These labor market conditions also “affected the
family-formation behavior of women” who invested in careers.74 Some
“decided to forgo motherhood entirely,” while “others delayed fertility until
they were well established in their careers.”75 When those women were ready
to have children, they “were in a much stronger bargaining position relative to
men than were women with less education,” because they had “more options
outside motherhood” and “were more mature and more knowledgeable about
the kind of partnerships they wanted.”76 Moreover, “they had a great deal to
offer their potential partners in terms of economic resources.”77 McLanahan
ties those assets and bargaining power to such women’s ability to establish
“more-egalitarian” partnerships with men that include features “valued by the
feminist movement,” such as “emotional support and help with child
rearing.”78
Meanwhile, how did these market changes affect less-advantaged women?
McLanahan claims that welfare policies for single mothers provide part of the
answer. Because of the structure of welfare benefits, including the use of
income testing, “when low-income mothers . . . worked or married, most of the
money they earned and most of their partners’ income was deducted from their
welfare benefits.”79 McLanahan argues that “economic theory suggests that
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See MCCLAIN, supra note 21, at 284-86 (discussing the commentary of David Popenoe
on women as gatekeepers and the work of Leon and Amy Kass on the role of female sexual
modesty); see also CAHN & CARBONE, FAMILY CLASSES, supra note 46 (manuscript at 76)
(explaining that the work of “relatively liberal” economists Akerlof, Yellen, and Katz “set
the stage” for conservative critiques, like that of Charles Murray, linking “the sexual
revolution to the increase in male fecklessness”). McLanahan cites to Akerlof and his
colleagues. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
71 McLanahan, supra note 7, at 617-18.
72 Id. at 618.
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 Id.
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welfare will increase nonmarital childbearing by making it easier for men to
shirk their parental responsibilities.”80 The empirical literature finds the
“effects of welfare receipt on union formation and dissolution” to be “small,”
but “not zero.”81 She contends that “when considered in conjunction with other
factors – such as the decline in low-skilled men’s earnings and the reduction in
men’s willingness to support children – the effects of welfare are likely to be
even larger.”82
McLanahan sums up the change that began in the 1960s thus: “[D]ifferent
forces were driving the behavior of women in the top and the bottom strata.”83
For women in the upper strata, “feminism was providing a new identity,
advances in birth control technology were providing the capacity, and
increases in economic opportunities were providing the incentives to delay
marriage and childbearing and to invest in careers.”84 By contrast, for women
in the bottom strata, “[t]he promise of a new identity and the new birth control
technologies . . . were of much less value,” since such women “had little
incentive to delay motherhood and pursue a career.”85 As for marriage,
“changes in the labor market conditions of low-skilled men were making the
potential partners of these women less ‘marriageable,’ while changes in norms,
bargaining power, and welfare benefits were making it easier for men to shirk
their fatherhood responsibilities.”86
Is the increase in single motherhood due more, then, to “women’s
unwillingness to commit to low-skilled men” or “to men’s unwillingness to
commit to women and children”?87 McLanahan explains that while we cannot
yet answer that question, we do know two pertinent things. First, “the second
demographic transition changed both the set of opportunities that men and
women face and the balance of power between them.” Second, “men and
women with the most education and the most resources appear to have
established a new equilibrium that is based on more-equal gender roles.”88
The urgent aims of McLanahan’s article are to explain why we should care
about these demographic trends and the “growing disparities in children’s
resources” and to make a case for the government to do something to
“ameliorate” the impact of these changes.89 Some of the changes about which
she worries concern adults, but many concern children. Focusing on adults, she
points out that “inequality may lead to social isolation,” so that the
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
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concentration of marriage among “high-income groups” may make “couples in
the bottom part of the distribution . . . come to see it as less attainable for them,
thus losing whatever benefits are associated with this universal institution.”90
McLanahan relates this possibility to the extensive research done by the
Fragile Families and Child Wellbeing Study, which finds that one reason given
by unmarried parents for not marrying is that “they are waiting until they can
achieve a certain lifestyle that they associate with marriage.”91 In the words of
one unmarried father, “‘I want to get my little house in Long Island, you know,
white-picket fence, and two car garage, me hitting the garbage cans when I pull
up in the driveway. You know . . . stuff like you see on TV.’”92 The problem is
that this level of economic security may be unrealistic.
Marriage, Andrew Cherlin has argued, has become a “marker of prestige,”
such that “the purchase of a home, and the acquisition of other accoutrements
of married life” allow the couple “to display their attainment of a prestigious,
comfortable, stable style of life.”93 In other work, McLanahan, with Kathryn
Edin and Christina Gibson-Davis, documents the “mismatch between
unmarried parents’ aspirations, expectations [for marriage] and their behavior,”
again using the Fragile Families and Child Wellbeing Study data.94 The
“retreat from marriage,” they report, coexists with a high level of voiced
support for “marriage as an institution.”95 This work confirms the view that
“financial stability is by far the most common concern” mentioned and “is a
necessary, though not sufficient, precondition for marriage for nearly all the
couples [on whom the study provided data].”96 Financial concerns, however,
include not simply “financial stability or responsibility,” but also building up
savings and attaining typical markers of a middle-class life, such as “a house, a
car, and other goods.”97 Assets are a “visible demonstration that the [couple]
can engage in long-term financial planning” and also “offer release from
financial worry,” which some unmarried parents believe “can lead to a level of
tension and strife” that can threaten marital stability.98 Most couples also want
to wait until they can “have a ‘decent’ wedding,” which, since they will be
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Id.
Id. (citing Sara McLanahan et al., Unwed Parents or Fragile Families?, in OUT OF
WEDLOCK: TRENDS, CAUSES, AND CONSEQUENCES OF NONMARITAL FERTILITY 202
(Lawrence L. Wu & Barbara Wolfe eds., 2001)).
92 Id. (quoting Christina Gibson et al., High Hopes but Even Higher Expectations: The
Retreat from Marriage Among Low-Income Couples (Ctr. for Research on Child Wellbeing,
Princeton University, Working Paper No. 2003-06-FF, 2004)).
93 Andrew J. Cherlin, The Deinstitutionalization of American Marriage, 66 J. MARRIAGE
& FAM. 848, 855, 857 (2004).
94 Gibson-Davis et al., supra note 43, at 1302.
95 Id.
96 Id. at 1307. There are also important relationship quality concerns, discussed below.
97 Id. at 1307-08.
98 Id.
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paying for it themselves, “requires extensive financial planning.”99 McLanahan
and her colleagues conclude: “Though these expectations may seem
impractical, we believe that they reflect the idea among low-income parents
that getting married should signal that the couple has ‘arrived’ in a financial
sense.”100
This research suggests that people assess their marriageability based on an
economic standard they see in the broader society. McLanahan and her
colleagues have developed an “identity model of marriage,” which posits that
marriage is associated with a set of norms about behaviors and living
standards, and “the psychological gains to marriage depend on how closely
people are able to match these ideals.”101 They show, using census data, that
“when individual income is held constant, the further men fall below the
median income of other men in their communities, the less likely they are to
marry.”102
McLanahan also argues that “we should be concerned about the high
prevalence of single mothers, especially among mothers in the lower social
strata.”103 On the one hand, “some single motherhood is probably a good sign
for society,” because it indicates women “have the freedom to opt out of bad
relationships.”104 On the other hand, “high levels of father absence are likely to
be a sign of social disorganization and isolation.”105 McLanahan points out that
single motherhood is associated with much higher poverty rates for children,
and is also a “proxy for multiple risk factors that do not bode well for
children.”106 Some of these risk factors pertain to the mothers themselves, such
as higher rates of clinical depression and drug and tobacco use during
pregnancy.107 Others factors relate to the fathers of these children, and include
“higher rates of substance abuse, disability, domestic violence, and
incarceration.”108 Unmarried parents have relationships that are “more complex
and less stable” than those of married parents, and their households “are more
likely to include children from other partnerships.”109 Unmarried-parent
families have higher poverty and unemployment rates. Further, there are
parenting-quality issues that are more prevalent among unmarried parents:
“[b]reast-feeding and language stimulation are less common, whereas harsh

99

Id. at 1308.
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101 McLanahan, supra note 7, at 620.
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parenting is more common.”110 McLanahan concludes that although it is not
possible to say “whether these marital-status differences are due to marriage
per se or to something about the parents who marry, there are theoretical
reasons for believing that father absence and high levels of union instability are
harmful to children.”111
If this is the problem, then what is the solution? McLanahan calls for
government to take an active role.112 She analogizes to the New Deal-era
creation of old age pensions “to address the increases in longevity that resulted
from the first demographic transition,” and observes that “most countries are
now creating institutions to deal with changes brought about by the second
transition.”113 Some policies she proposes would seek to shape the behavior of
adult men and women, while others would ameliorate the impact of
demographic changes on children’s “diverging destinies.”114 For example, she
asks, “what policies may encourage mothers and fathers in the lowest quartile
to adopt the behaviors of parents in the top quartile?”115 In the case of “women
from disadvantaged backgrounds,” that desired behavior is to “delay
childbearing, invest in education and training, and form stable partnerships.”116
For “men from disadvantaged backgrounds,” the aim is to get them “to remain
committed to their children.”117 She proposes economic policies to “make it
possible for men and women in the bottom strata to achieve the living standard
they associate with marriage.”118 Those policies include the Earned Income
Tax Credit, as well as “subsidized child care and preschools” that will “make
work more rewarding” and also “directly increase[] children’s resources.”119
The United States is a comparative laggard, it seems, in developing educational
institutions.120
To address developments in contraception and abortion rights, which have
“undermined men’s willingness to take responsibility for their children,”
McLanahan eschews shotgun weddings but insists upon policies, such as child

110 Id. at 622. On class differences and language stimulation, see Tina Rosenberg, OpEd., The Power of Talking to Your Baby, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 10, 2013, 3:25 PM), available at
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/04/10/the-power-of-talking-to-your-baby/?_r=0
(“A poor child is likely to hear millions fewer words at home than a child from a
professional family. And the disparity matters.”).
111 McLanahan, supra note 7, at 622.
112 Id. at 622-23.
113 Id. at 622.
114 Id. at 622-23.
115 Id. at 622.
116 Id.
117 Id.
118 Id.
119 Id.
120 Id.
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support enforcement, that “hold men responsible for the children they sire,”121
while also, evidently, reducing nonmarital fertility.122 She also urges reforms to
the “marriage penalty” in welfare and income-support policies, so that these
policies do not “discourage work and marriage.”123
Finally, McLanahan urges policymakers to learn some lessons from
feminism.124 She observes that the federal government already spends money
on a marriage initiative, which aims, among other things, “to improve
communication skills within couples and to improve mutual understanding and
trust.”125 While these programs have their skeptics, McLanahan points out that
“the goal of ‘building mutual understanding and trust’ is consistent with the
new marital standards envisioned by feminism.”126 The Fragile Families and
Child Wellbeing Study’s qualitative research indicates that “disputes over
sexual infidelity and gender mistrust are serious issues for many low-income
couples,” and other research bears out these findings.127 Addressing these
concerns, McLanahan points out that “marriage-promotion programs . . . may
increase union stability among some low-income parents.”128
McLanahan reiterates her opening thesis in closing: “[M]others with the
most economic independence are leading the way, not in single motherhood,
but in establishing stable unions that are based on a more equal sharing of
parental responsibilities.”129 Further, she argues that government should play
an “important role” in “ensuring that children have adequate resources in the
new world that is being created by the demographic changes in family
behavior” because “children deserve no less” than what government did for the
elderly in the first transition.130
B.

The Other Marriage Equality Problem and Reauthorizing TANF:
Remember When?

The Fragile Families and Child Wellbeing Study, for which McLanahan has
been a principal investigator, follows a cohort of several thousand children
born in large U.S. cities between 1998 and 2000; the study uses the term
“fragile families” to reflect that three-fourths of such children were born to
121

Id.
Id.
123 Id. at 622-23.
124 Id. at 623.
125 Id. McLanahan refers to the Healthy Marriage Initiative started in 2002 by the Bush
Administration. Subsequently, in 2005, Congress established an annual funding stream to
promote healthy marriage and responsible fatherhood. For further discussion of these
programs, see infra notes 145-47 and accompanying text.
126 Id.
127 Id. (citing Cherlin, supra note 93, at 855-56).
128 Id.
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unmarried parents and that those families are “at greater risk of breaking up
and living in poverty than more traditional families.”131 The study focuses on
child outcomes, as well as on the parents themselves, including the
“capabilities and conditions” of the unmarried parents (especially the fathers)
and the relationship between the unmarried parents.132 Why such parents do
not marry has riveted the attention of scholars and lawmakers. Thus, DeParle’s
news story about two forms of motherhood and the marital divide133 echoes
debates in Congress a decade or more ago over the reauthorization of the
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program, a part of the
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA)
originally enacted in 1996. Drawing on the Fragile Families and Child
Wellbeing Study, members of Congress seized on the notion of a “magic
moment,” the birth of a child, when eighty percent of the unmarried parents
studied were romantically involved and a majority expressed an intention to
marry.134 Lawmakers reasoned that policy interventions should seize on that
magic moment and help those parents follow through on their good
intentions.135 Alas, the Fragile Families researchers found that, despite
unmarried parents’ high intentions, few couples actually married.136
Another sociological finding that members of Congress found encouraging
during the TANF reauthorization debates was that low-income mothers held
the institution of marriage in high regard.137 Indeed, far from rejecting
marriage as obsolete, these mothers held it in high esteem and did not wish to
marry until they had what they considered the prerequisites for a successful
marriage.138 In an influential article and subsequent book, Kathryn Edin
(another Fragile Families researcher) identified both economic obstacles to
marriage, such as the conviction that a couple should have a secure economic
footing before marrying, and relationship quality concerns, such as distrust of
men and concern over control.139 “Most mothers,” Edin told Congress, “want a
partnership of equals.”140 In a memorable turn of phrase, she reported women’s
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See About the Fragile Families and Child Wellbeing Study, supra note 43.
Id.
133 DeParle, supra note 1.
134 I discuss congressional interest in the Fragile Families and Child Wellbeing Study in
MCCLAIN, supra note 21, at 123.
135 Id.
136 See Gibson-Davis et al., supra note 43, at 1302 (describing the mismatch between
unmarried parents’ aspirations, expectations, and behavior).
137 MCCLAIN, supra note 21, at 122-23.
138 Gibson-Davis et al., supra note 43, at 1307.
139 See
Kathryn Edin, Few Good Men, AM. PROSPECT (Dec. 19, 2001),
www.prospect.org/article/few-good-men; see also KATHRYN EDIN & MARIA KEFALAS,
PROMISES I CAN KEEP: WHY POOR WOMEN PUT MOTHERHOOD BEFORE MARRIAGE 9 (2005).
140 MCCLAIN, supra note 21, at 117 (quoting Hearing on Welfare and Marriage Issues
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view that “‘[a] man gets married to have somebody take care of them ‘cause
their mommy can’t do it anymore.’”141 Edin observed that “[m]ost mothers
don’t want to be owned or slave for their husband.”142 Edin’s testimony reports
the same relationship-quality concerns found by McLanahan and other Fragile
Families researchers.
During the TANF reauthorization debates, lawmakers focused intensely on
promoting “healthy marriage” and “responsible fatherhood.” Marriage
promotion was also a cornerstone in President George W. Bush’s welfare
reauthorization proposals.143 Lawmakers argued that welfare reform had been a
success in moving mothers “from welfare to work,” but less successful in
achieving its family-formation goals, such as reinforcing the concept that
marriage is the proper setting in which to have children and that the twoparent, mother-father marital family is both the best guarantor of child
wellbeing and a potent anti-poverty device.144 Lawmakers pondered: How
could public policy make men more “marriageable”? Might relationship and
marriage education help? Training in parenthood skills? Household financial
management? And, of course, what about investment in men’s human capital,
such as through education and job training? All of these solutions were
features in the various “responsible fatherhood” initiatives proposed over the
years and in the ultimate legislation, the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 (DRA),
which authorized grants to governmental and nongovernmental groups to
promote healthy marriage and responsible fatherhood.145 Even prior to the
DRA, the Department of Health and Human Services’ Administration for
Children and Families had launched a “Healthy Marriage Initiative.”146 The
DRA also established the Healthy Marriage and Responsible Fatherhood
Program and funded the still-ongoing National Healthy Marriage Resource

(2001) (statement of Kathryn Edin, Associate Professor of Sociology, Institute of Policy
Research, Northwestern University) [hereinafter Edin Statement]).
141 Id. (quoting Edin Statement, supra note 140, at 82).
142 Id. (quoting Edin Statement, supra note 140, at 82).
143 See, e.g., Working Toward Independence: Promote Child Well-Being and Healthy
Marriages, WHITE HOUSE (Feb. 2002), http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/re
leases/2002/02/welfare-book-05.html.
144 See MCCLAIN, supra note 21, at 121-34. See generally Personal Responsibility and
Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 101, 110 Stat. 2015,
2110-12 (stating findings in support of PRWORA’s passage and its family formation
purposes).
145 Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171, § 7103, 120 Stat. 4, 138-40
(2006). For discussion of various “responsible fatherhood” initiatives undertaken by states,
as well as bills proposed in Congress, see MCCLAIN, supra note 21, at 121-26.
146 Strengthening Families, Healthy Marriage and Responsible Fatherhood, U.S. DEP’T
HEALTH & HUM. SERVICES, http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/opre/research/topic/overview/
strengthening-families-healthy-marriage-responsible-fatherhood (last visited May 12, 2013)
(compiling studies undertaken as part of this initiative).
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Center and National Responsible Fatherhood Clearinghouse websites.147 In
2010 new federal legislation continued such funding.148
I revisit the reauthorization debates and the launching of the federal
government’s marriage initiatives to suggest both the persistence of concerns
over the separation of parenthood from marriage and the new direction those
concerns are taking in focusing on the conduct of the middle class. Back when
the Clinton Administration and federal lawmakers defended PRWORA as an
opportunity to “end welfare as we know it,” the focus was on closing the
evident divide between the middle class, a group that “played by the rules”
concerning family formation, and the welfare poor, who were allegedly out of
touch with “fundamental [American] values of work, responsibility, and
family.”149 In the reauthorization debates, armed with evidence that lowincome parents, in fact, did value marriage, lawmakers touted healthy marriage
and responsible fatherhood as a way to close the gap between low-income
women and men’s marital aspirations and practices, making available to them,
for example, the same marriage education available to middle-class couples.150
In striking contrast to those earlier efforts, contemporary warnings about the
marriage divide focus on the growing gap between the middle class – or
“Middle America” – and the most advantaged Americans.
The emphasis in the PRWORA and TANF reauthorization debates on
“personal responsibility,” as well as on the interplay of behavioral and
structural factors in explaining poverty and patterns of family formation, has
resonance for contemporary diagnoses of the “end of men” and of the marriage
divide. One important feature of those debates was the concern that the intense
focus on moving mothers from welfare to work – from dependence to
independence – was leaving poor men behind.151 What should “personal
responsibility” mean as applied to men, not only to women?152 Certainly,
147

NAT’L HEALTHY MARRIAGE RESOURCE CENTER, http://www.healthymarriageinfo.org
(last visited May 12, 2013); NAT’L RESPONSIBLE FATHERHOOD CLEARINGHOUSE, http://www
.fatherhood.gov (last visited May 12, 2013).
148 See Claims Resolution Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-291, § 811(b), 124 Stat. 3064,
3159.
149 See Presidential Statement on Signing the Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, 32 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1487, 1488 (Aug.
22, 1996); McClain, supra note 11, at 352-57, 374-85 (discussing examples of this rhetoric
in the PRWORA debates and in defenses of the “family cap”).
150 MCCLAIN, supra note 21, at 121-34; McClain, supra note 11, at 415-16 (analyzing the
use of personal responsibility arguments in 1990s welfare reform debates, including the idea
that poor people on welfare should “play by the rules” in the same way that that working
Americans purportedly did).
151 See MCCLAIN, supra note 21, at 121-34. In this Symposium, Professor Khiara Bridges
points out the pertinent ways in which black men had already “ended” prior to TANF’s
reauthorization. Khiara M. Bridges, TANF and the End (Maybe?) of Poor Men, 93 B.U. L.
REV. 1141, 1144-47 (2013).
152 See Dorit Geva, Not Just Maternalism: Marriage and Fatherhood in American
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Congress interpreted fathers’ personal responsibility to entail financial support,
and it called for getting tough on “deadbeat dads” by expanding efforts to
establish paternity and collect child support.153 But what if dads faced
economic and other structural barriers that made taking “personal
responsibility” difficult? Did the government have any obligation to help? The
Clinton Administration spoke about the problems of “dead-broke” dads,154 and
the keen interest in responsible-fatherhood initiatives dates back to that
administration.155 Those initiatives, it warrants mention, also included
noneconomic aspects of parenthood in defining “responsible fatherhood,” such
as active involvement by a father in his child’s life. During his time in the U.S.
Senate, Barack Obama sponsored responsible fatherhood legislation; as
President, he has promoted responsible fatherhood as “every father taking
responsibility for his child’s intellectual, emotional, and financial wellbeing.”156 For example responsible-fatherhood campaigns launched under the
Obama Administration promote active parenting, urging men to “take time to
be a dad today.”157 The meaning of responsible fatherhood is also at issue in
contemporary discussions of the marriage divide. As I shall discuss below,
Rosin and Murray both offer evidence of a gender gap when it comes to the
exercise of personal responsibility by those who are not among the marriage
elite. Both also return us to perennial debates about the interplay of personal
and public responsibility.
Another interplay that holds contemporary relevance is the one that runs
between economics and culture. In the 1990s some Republican welfare critics
memorably drew a connection between “intergenerational poverty” and a
“poverty of values.”158 Christina Gibson-Davis, Kathryn Edin, and Sara
McLanahan consider the role of “culture” as one explanation for the reasons
that unmarried parents separate marriage and parenthood:
[W]hat the parents in our study did not say about marriage is worth
noting. Couples rarely referred to their children when discussing
marriage, and none believed that having a child was a sufficient

Welfare Policy, 18 SOC. POL.: INT’L STUD. GENDER ST. & SOC’Y 24, 40-42 (2011).
153 Id. at 40. This push for stricter laws also had implications for mothers, who must
cooperate with such efforts in order to receive TANF benefits.
154 See, e.g., President William J. Clinton, The President’s Radio Address (June 17,
2000) (transcript available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=58649).
155 See Geva, supra note 152, at 37.
156 See Responsible Fatherhood and Healthy Families Act of 2009, S. 1309, 111th Cong.
(2009); THE WHITE HOUSE, PROMOTING RESPONSIBLE FATHERHOOD (2012), available at http
://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/fatherhood_report_6.13.12_final.pdf.
157 For examples of such campaigns, see NAT’L RESPONSIBLE FATHERHOOD
CLEARINGHOUSE, supra note 147.
158 See McClain, supra note 11, at 347-52 (citing remarks by Vice President Dan Quayle
in After the Riots; Excerpts from Vice President’s Speech on Cities and Poverty, N.Y.
TIMES, May 20, 1992, at A20).
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motivation for marriage. Furthermore, no parent talked about marriage
enhancing the life chances of their child. One possible explanation for
this omission is that couples with these beliefs marry before giving birth
to a child and are thus not in our unmarried sample. More likely, the
parents in our sample did not discuss children vis-à-vis marriage because
they see childrearing and marriage as separate decisions that no longer
necessarily go together. The expectations that couples have of marriage –
financial stability and a relatively high degree of relational quality – apply
only to matrimony, not to parenthood.159
The authors point out that researchers have previously suggested that the
“separation between fertility and matrimony” among “low-income African
Americans” may be a “rational response to their constrained circumstances.”160
They posit an “alternative explanation that unmarried couples with children
have become the norm,” such that “everyday experiences reinforce the idea
that marriage is a singular event with its own high expectations.”161 What light
do they shed on the puzzle of why the retreat from marriage does not bring a
retreat from parenthood? The retreat from marriage, they conclude, seems to
rest on a “cultural explanation”: as “the bar for marriage has grown higher for
all Americans,” those in the “lower portion of the income distribution” find it
increasingly difficult to “meet the standards associated with marriage.”162 At
the same time, low-income couples “defer marriage while continuing to bear
children” because of “other shifts in the American ethos, especially the view
that marriage is no longer the only appropriate venue for childrearing.”163
Thus, by titling their influential book Promises I Can Keep: Why Poor Women
Put Motherhood Before Marriage, Edin and Kefalas highlighted the
comparatively higher degree of confidence low-income women have in their
capacity to be good mothers than in their capacity to form successful marriages
with their child’s father.164
As I will now discuss, the Pew Research Center’s study bears out this shift
in the American ethos about marriage and childbearing, even as that ethos is in
tension with views about what type of household setting is best for children.
C.

The Decline of Marriage: “Who Needs Marriage?” vs. a Class-Based
Marriage Divide

Since the commencement of the Fragile Families and Child Wellbeing
Study, which examined low-income parents, more recent surveys and studies
document the decline of marriage among the middle class and among those
159
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with some college education but not a college degree. The decline of marriage
has enjoyed prominent news coverage and is also a central theme of Murray’s
book, which I discuss in Part IV. Rather than simply a rich-poor divide, these
studies describe the marriage gap as a growing divide between a small group of
marriage “haves” and a much larger group of marriage “have nots.” At the
same time, these studies also raise the “Who needs marriage?” question in a
way that suggests that people do not marry as a matter of choice, not because
they view marriage as out of reach. Moreover, the decline in marriage rates
seen among moderately educated middle-class couples is occurring at the same
time as an observable separation of marriage from parenthood among members
of the middle class. Reminiscent of the shifting “ethos” McLanahan and her
co-authors observed concerning whether marriage and parenthood still go
together, these studies also find that public opinion does not view marriage as
the only way to form a family or the only setting in which to parent.
1.

Marriage as a “Shrinking Institution”165: Obsolete or Out of Reach?

In November 2010 the Pew Research Center, in conjunction with TIME,
released a highly publicized report, The Decline of Marriage and Rise of New
Families.166 One basic message was that marriage is a “shrinking institution”:
marriage is no longer the “pre-eminent family unit” that it was during the midtwentieth century.167 Rather, “[a] variety of new arrangements have emerged,
giving rise to a broader and evolving definition of what constitutes a
family.”168 The report observes that “[m]arriage is no longer considered a
prerequisite for parenthood.”169 As I have elaborated elsewhere, this report
shows both public recognition of family diversity and sharp public division
about how to evaluate such diversity.170 Notably, a large majority views the
increase in single mothers raising children without paternal involvement in the
child’s life as a “bad thing for society.”171 A smaller majority of young people
hold this view.172 The report shows lower levels of public concern over a samesex couple raising children, perhaps suggesting the strength of the belief that a
child should have two parents.173 With respect to the link between marriage
and parenthood, the report shows some findings that seem to be in tension with
each other. For example, a majority of Americans do not view “having
165
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children” as the most important reason to marry; only 59% of married people
and 44% of unmarried people considered it a “very important” reason to marry,
well behind love, making a lifelong commitment, and companionship.174 A
majority, however, agree with the statement that “a child needs a home with
both a mother and a father to grow up happily.”175 Within this majority,
however, there is a notable generational difference: only 53% of young people
agreed with the statement as compared to 75% of respondents over sixtyfive.176
Considering the class-based marriage equality problem, the report finds that
“a marriage gap and a socio-economic gap have been growing side by side for
the past half century, and each may be feeding off the other.”177 The report
finds that “[m]arriage rates are now more strongly linked to education than
they have been in the past, with college graduates (64%) much more likely to
be married than those who have never attended college (48%).”178 The report
finds even larger racial differences; for instance, the marriage gap between
blacks and whites has “increased significantly over time,” so that “[b]lacks
(32%) are much less likely than whites (56%) to be married.”179 Moreover,
“black children (52%) are nearly three times as likely as white children (18%)
and nearly twice as likely as Hispanic children (27%) to live with one
parent.”180 Echoing the findings of McLanahan and other family researchers,
the report notes a gap between marital aspirations and practice, attributable to a
perceived economic bar to marriage: “adults on the lower rungs of the socioeconomic ladder (whether measured by income or education) are just as eager
as other adults to marry,” but “they place a higher premium on economic
security as a prerequisite for marriage than do those with higher levels of
income and education.”181 “[T]his is a bar that they – and their pool of
prospective spouses – may find increasingly difficult to meet, given the fact
that, relative to other groups, they have experienced significant economic
declines in recent decades.”182 Generational differences are also contributing to
the decline of marriage, as younger adults are “delaying marriage and entering
into less-traditional family arrangements.”183 This trend allows the report to tell
two demographic stories simultaneously: a story about marriage “haves” and
174
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“have nots” as well as a story about how marriage is, or at least may be
becoming, obsolete.
The report notes the relevance of socioeconomic status to marriage and the
divergence in the family lives of those with and without a college education (a
theme also pursued at length by Murray and in the State of Our Unions
reports). The report observes: “2007 marked the first time that collegeeducated young adults were more likely than those without a college degree to
have married by the age of 30.”184 Indeed, “college graduates are now much
more likely than those without a college degree to live in a traditional, 1950sstyle family.”185 By “traditional,” the report seems to mean living in a
household with spouse and children, not the particular gendered division of
labor in a 1950s household.186 As the report’s accompanying TIME story, Who
Needs Marriage? A Changing Institution, authored by Belinda Lusbcombe,
emphasizes (using the marriage of Prince William and Kate Middleton as an
example), the trend in marriage is toward assortative mating: people
increasingly marry later and marry partners “on the same socioeconomic and
educational level.”187 This change is due, in significant part, to women’s
advances in education and in the economy, since “it’s more likely than it used
to be that a male college graduate will meet, fall in love with, wed and share
the salary of a woman with a degree.”188
The trend toward assortative marriage relates to the emerging template of
the egalitarian marriage as the best form of marriage. The Pew report notes that
“more than six-in-ten (62%) now say that the best kind of marriage is one
where the husband and wife both work and both take care of the household and
children. In 1977, fewer than half (48%) endorsed this egalitarian template for
spousal roles.”189 Parallel data show changes in wives’ roles: wives comprised
32% of the workforce in 1960 and comprise 61% of the workforce now.190
What the public believes to be desirable qualities in a spouse are highly similar
for a husband and a wife, another sign of an emerging egalitarian template.191
Nonetheless, some of the report’s findings suggest either the residual hold of
gender conventions or public ambivalence about gender roles. For example, a
strong majority (67%) of respondents believe that a man should “be able to
support a family financially in order to be ready for marriage,” while “only
33% say this is [a] very important” factor for assessing a woman’s readiness.192
184
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The Pew report interprets this data as showing “the public’s ambivalence about
changing gender roles over the past half century.”193 For example, most
Americans embrace the changing role of women in society, with only 19%
saying women should return to their traditional roles in society.194 At the same
time, 71% also proclaim they “have old-fashioned values about family and
marriage.”195 As noted above, one example of these old-fashioned values
seems to be the solid majority of those surveyed who believe that “single
women having children” is a “bad thing for society.”196
One message in Luscombe’s article is that “the kids may not be all right.”197
The author declares that, “[r]arely is there a bigger chasm between what
Americans believe to be the best things for society and what actually happens
than in the bearing and raising of children.”198 The public views marital status
as “irrelevant to achieving respect, happiness, career goals, financial security
or a fulfilling sex life,” but believes that raising kids is “best done married,”
even though “few people say children are the most important reason” to get
married.199 The article reports findings from the Fragile Families and Child
Wellbeing Study concerning the gap between marital expectations and practice
and emphasizing the likelihood that children born to unmarried mothers would
experience their mother living with a new partner.200
Luscombe concludes that, “[i]t seems that the 21st century marriage, with its
emphasis on a match of equals, has brought about a surge in inequality.”201 The
causal relationships between the burdens of poverty and the impermanence of
relationships are not clear, and so neither is the solution.202 The article asks
whether marriage, “which used to be like the draft,” is “now becoming more
like West Point, admitting only the elite and sending the others off to the front
line.”203 Marriage-education experts urge bolstering marriage and teaching
communication skills, while “[s]ociologists tend to believe the answers lie
outside marriage,” such as through fostering higher societal expectations
concerning alternative family arrangements and expecting “‘responsible
behavior outside as well as inside marriage.’”204 Curiously, given the identified
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socioeconomic gap between married and unmarried couples,205 the story offers
no recommendations for economic policy.
2.

The Fragile Middle, or Middle America’s “Retreat” from Marriage

The State of Our Unions 2012 report, issued by The National Marriage
Project at the University of Virginia and the Institute for American Values, is
titled The President’s Marriage Agenda for the Forgotten Sixty Percent.206
Who is included in this sixty percent, and how are they forgotten? The report’s
thesis is that “[i]n ‘Middle America,’ defined here as the nearly 60 percent of
Americans aged 25 to 60 who have a high school but not a four-year college
degree, marriage is rapidly slipping away.”207 This is “astonishing” and
worrying because, as Barbara Dafoe Whitehead states, “‘[f]our decades ago,
these moderately educated Americans led the kind of family lives that looked
much like the family lives of the more highly educated. They were just as
likely to be happily married, and just as likely to be in first marriages.’”208 Like
the Fragile Families and Child Wellbeing Study, this report also identifies a
mismatch between marital expectations and behavior. It speaks of the “plight”
of “this population who once married in high proportions and formed families
within marriage – and who still aspire to marriage but increasingly are unable
to achieve it” as “the social challenge for our times.”209
The link between fragile families and middle-class families is further
evidenced by the report’s reiteration of an observation from an earlier State of
Our Unions report, which warned of “the retreat from marriage in Middle
America.”210 The earlier report, When Marriage Disappears: The New Middle
America, found that, as marriage among the “moderately-educated middle
begins to resemble the fragile state of marriage among the poor, the family
patterns of the high school educated become ‘more likely to resemble those of
high school dropouts, with all the attendant problems of economic stress,
partner conflict, single parenting, and troubled children.’”211 Another parallel
between fragile families and middle-class families is the increasing willingness
of Middle Americans to separate marriage from parenthood: “Middle
America’s couples express reservations about marriage but still want, and are
having, children.”212 The 2012 report expresses concerns about the impact on
“children of Middle America,” who are “growing up without stable families to
205
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help them weather economic change, deregulation, and globalization” and who
also suffer “[t]he loss of social opportunity,” with attendant costs for
taxpayers.213 The report worries about the instability of cohabitation as
compared to marriage, and, quoting Andrew Cherlin, expresses concern about
Americans “stepping ‘on and off the carousel of intimate relationships’
increasingly rapidly.”214 This marriage decline leads to “a society of winners
and losers,” with implications for the next generation: children of “married,
well-educated parents are increasingly likely to have the same advantages
when they become adults, graduating from four-year colleges and establishing
marriages that are, on average, more stable and of better quality than in the
recent past.”215 In effect, social reproduction among the married will include
the reproduction of advantage while social reproduction in Middle America
will “increasingly” reproduce disadvantage: “[T]hose born to fragmented
families are increasingly likely to repeat their parents’ patterns and to
experience the heartache, hardship, and risks that result.”216
What factors does the State of Our Unions 2012 report believe contribute to
this “rapid disappearance of marriage in Middle America”?217 The report
references Murray’s Coming Apart as sparking a debate on the issue and
summarizes his conclusion that “the greatest source of inequality in America is
not economic but cultural, stemming from millions of Americans losing touch
with founding virtues.”218 The report also observes that some policymakers,
not focused directly on marriage, advocate greater investment in “family
planning, job training, and post-secondary education,” in order to reduce levels
of nonmarital births and increase rates of high school graduates going to
college.219 My concern here is not to engage the “truth of the matter” in terms
of what best explains the observed trends in marriage patterns, but rather to
report the mix of cultural and economic approaches. The report does propose
some concrete economic policies (similar to McLanahan’s proposals) aimed at
improving “the culture of marriage in Middle America.”220 Strikingly, it
references “[r]ecent popular analyses,” including Rosin’s, “suggest[ing] that
we are seeing the ‘end of men’” and responds with measures to “help young
men become marriageable men” by inspiring and equipping them “to be better
husbands and fathers.”221 These measures include economic programs, such as
apprenticeships, as well as more marriage-focused initiatives, such as
213
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responding to the high rate of male incarceration by using the “resources of the
criminal justice system to help intervene and offer relationship education and
hope for a good marriage,” thereby increasing the odds of incarcerated young
men “turning their lives around” and having a decent marriage.222 The report
observes that “[m]ost of these young men will have children, whether we
intervene or not.”223 This proposal responds directly to the concern that there is
a shortage of marriageable African American men because so many have
become caught up in the criminal justice system.224 The report also applauds
ongoing efforts by the military to support healthy family relationships amid the
stresses of military deployment and post-traumatic stress disorder.225
There are many other components of the report’s proposed marriage agenda,
many of which focus on relationship education sponsored by state and federal
governments.226 Some, as the report’s title suggests, focus on cultural
initiatives, such as using public service campaigns and statements by the
President and Hollywood stars to “convey the truth about marriage, family
stability, and child well-being to the next generation of parents.”227 Since this
report is the first State of Our Unions report issued since Institute for American
Values president David Blankenhorn announced his support for same-sex
marriage, it warrants mention that the report states that, whether one is for,
against, or uncertain about gay marriage, one can still talk about marriage.228
Here, nonetheless, the focus is on heterosexuals: “Talk about gay marriage –
and then talk about why marriage is important for the vast majority of people
who identify as heterosexual and whose sexual lives quite often produce
children. Why does marriage matter for those kids?”229
The report does not directly engage issues of egalitarian models of marriage
versus other models. The only mention of gender equality is the notion that if
one supports women’s rights, one could talk about how “raising children in
marriage is on average a much easier road for women and their families,” and
that, if one is concerned about domestic violence, one should realize that there
are far greater risks of such violence “with boyfriends and live-in partners than
in marriage.”230
The report closes by sounding a cry for recognizing the link between
marriage and social reproduction; it calls on the president, other leaders, and
222
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fellow citizens to “join us in supporting marriage as a vital pathway to opening
social opportunity – for today’s young people, and their children.”231
III. WHAT HAPPENS TO MARRIAGE WITH THE END OF MEN AND THE RISE OF
WOMEN?
Hanna Rosin’s book, The End of Men: And the Rise of Women, offers a
window into both dimensions of the other marriage equality problem: the class
divide and gender dynamics within and outside of marriage. Her book also
highlights the tension evident in contrasting news stories about the future of
marriage. On one account, marriage is a class privilege, where now not just the
poor, but also the undereducated middle class, are left out. On another,
marriage – and intimate relationships more broadly – are simply not on the
agenda of an increasing number of people who live satisfying lives as “single
by choice.”232 As a feminist scholar, I find intriguing Rosin’s exploration of
the reasons that women across the class divide decide that marriage is not for
them, or at least, not for them right now.
A.

Who Needs Marriage?: Avoiding “Derailment” from Relationships

Rosin reports that one reason for marriage not being on the agenda for some
highly ambitious and successful women is because they perceive that a
relationship with a man will simply get in their way or even derail them.233 In
her much-discussed chapter on the hookup culture, Rosin observes that
“today’s college girl likens a serious suitor to an accidental pregnancy in the
nineteenth century: a danger to be avoided at all costs, lest it thwart a
promising future.”234 Rosin asserts that research shows that “women benefit
greatly from living in a world where they can have sexual adventure without
commitment or all that much shame, and where they can enter into temporary
relationships that don’t derail their careers.”235 Rosin even asserts that
“feminist progress is largely dependent on hook-up culture,” and that women
perpetuate that culture because it serves their own ends, such as by allowing
them to focus on school performance, employment, and their financial future
instead of relationships.236 As these college graduates move on to become
high-achieving career women, they learn to use their “erotic capital”
strategically, since they “no longer need men for financial security and social
influence.”237 Even when young women may be ready for marriage, one
problem is that young men, for a variety of reasons, including immersion in
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“universal frat boy culture,” are “no longer suitable for stable romantic
relationships, especially relationships with ‘equal status female mates.’”238
Nonetheless, Rosin ends the chapter on a happily-ever-after note: Sabrina, an
ambitious business school graduate who had previously sought to root out any
personal vulnerability and broke off several engagements, was now planning
her wedding.239
One criticism of Rosin is her inadequate analysis of less-privileged female
college students.240 For such women, according to Rosin, an unsatisfactory
marriage seems both inevitable and a trap to escape. Rosin reports that these
women “came to college mostly with boyfriends back home and the
expectation of living a life similar to their parents’: make it through school,
start work immediately, and get married along the way.”241 They found the
hookup culture “initially alienating” and felt “trapped between the choice of
marrying a kind of hometown guy they called ‘the disaster’ – a man who never
gets off the couch and steals their credit card – or joining a sexual culture that
made them uncomfortable.”242 She then reports that such women came to see
that “[s]uccess meant seeing the hook-up culture for what it is: a path out of a
dead-end existence, free from a life yoked to the ‘disaster.’”243 She gives
anecdotal evidence of the hookup culture opening up young women’s horizons
so that they need not marry and settle down right away, like their peers back
home.244 Sherry Linkon insightfully comments that Rosin paints the options
these working-class women perceive as “two extremes” and leaves out the
possibility of “plenty of open space and many options” between them,
238
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“including the possibility that an educated woman from a working-class
background could construct a fulfilling relationship with an uneducated man
with whom she shares a home culture.”245 For example, this type of marriage is
one that many black women form, given disparities in levels of education
between black women and men.246 Instead, Rosin seems to view “marrying a
working-class man” as “an inherently bad, even foolish choice.”247 Rosin also
“glibly exaggerate[s] the tensions working-class women might feel with the
‘classed self-development imperative’ of higher education.”248
B.

The Seesaw Marriage

Rosin picks up the narrative thread in the next chapter with portraits of the
“seesaw marriage.”249 This term refers to the allegedly egalitarian marriages
formed by elites – well-educated people who have careers and balance work
and family based on criteria other than the traditional malebreadwinner/female-caregiver dichotomy. Or try to, anyway. How do things
work in “seesaw marriages,” or what Rosin calls “true love (just for elites)”?250
In theory, the “new model of elite marriage” is a “constantly shifting equation”
in terms of who does what and whose career and personal needs take
precedence at any one time: “sixty-forty or eighty-twenty or ninety-ten.”251
The actual portraits in the chapter reveal, as Rosin puts it, “tensions under the
surface.”252 Facing new roles as caregivers, men are experiencing “the old
Betty Friedan identity crisis, only in masculine form.”253 Indeed, in Rosin’s
stories, men are clearly struggling and are even “haunted by the specter of a
coming gender apocalypse.”254
The division of labor of some of the couples Rosin profiles suggests that the
seesaw is tilted too far toward the woman assuming too many responsibilities
and the man assuming too few. One example is Steven and Sarah Andrews,
both in their thirties, whom Rosin describes as “consummate ‘marriage
planners,’ the current reigning model among the professional class.”255 She
works; he stays home and takes care of their child and is a self-described
245
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“mediocre house dude,” committed just to keeping the house “mildly clean.”256
Sarah, not surprisingly, feels that she actually is “in charge of both realms” –
work and home – whirling into action at home after a long day at work, while
Steven “feels entitled to check out on evenings and weekends.”257 This makes
Sarah “‘tired and sometimes angry.’”258
Despite all that Sarah does, Rosin reports that “there is a reigning notion in
the Andrews house that Steven is ultimately the one in charge, that if anything
ever went wrong, Steven would stand between his family and disaster.”259
Sarah analogizes their situation to the television show Charlie’s Angels, with
Steven as Charlie and Sarah doing his bidding: planner and executor.260 Rosin
acknowledges, however, that “[t]his may be a fiction they both perpetuate
because women have not yet become accustomed to owning the power even
when it is so obviously theirs.”261 It may also be a way that men “preserve the
protector aspect of being the breadwinner even when they are not earning the
money,” or it may, or may not, be a way to “save men from obsolescence and
give them space to invent an entirely new way of being a happy, harmonious
family in the age of female power.”262
If this is the portrait of an egalitarian marriage among the elite, it is rather
disheartening. Further, Steven himself does not seem to think men are much
good. Rosin concludes the chapter with their son Xavier taking off his diaper
and “pee[ing] in the hallway for maybe the third time that day.”263 Steven
philosophizes: “‘All boys do is pee on things. Nothing good comes from being
a man. Women bring good things to the world. I live longer if I have a wife. I
have a better, healthier life.’”264 In fact, Steven is correct that marriage does
have health and other benefits, especially for men, because of what Linda
Waite and Maggie Gallagher call the “virtues of [wifely] nagging.”265 Earlier
in the chapter, Rosin reports research that “men need marriage more than
women do”266 and that it benefits men more than women.267 Even more
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striking is Steven’s statement about his son: “‘I wanted a little Anne of Green
Gables. Someone creative and good. I would love it if the next one is a little
girl. Like my wife. A superstar.’”268 Unlike Murray, Rosin does not pay
attention to the social reproduction of advantage; that is, how people in seesaw
marriages transmit advantage to their children. Her focus is more on how
individual men are coping with changing roles and prefiguring “what marriage
will look like in the not too distant future, when more women than men are
paying the bills.”269
C.

The “New American Matriarchy” Among the Married . . . and Unmarried

Rosin explores the other side of the class divide over marriage in her
chapter, “The New American Matriarchy: The Middle Class Gets a Sex
Change.”270 I augment my discussion with her New York Times Magazine
cover story, Who Wears the Pants in This Economy?: When Jobs Go Away,
Husbands and Wives Make a New Deal,271 timed to coincide with the release
of her book. Together, the book and article focus on women and men dealing
with “upended gender dynamics”272 in two types of relationships: (1) those of
younger, generally unmarried, couples, in which striving middle-class women
see unemployed and underemployed men as not adding much of value to their
lives or even making their lives harder, and (2) marital relationships among
older couples trying to adjust to a new division of labor triggered by male job
loss in the recession.
Startlingly, Rosin uses the term “matriarchy” in her book and cover story
without making any historical reference to Daniel Patrick Moynihan’s widely
discussed use of the term in his controversial 1965 report, The Negro Family:
The Case for National Action.273 Instead, when she comments that the pattern
of women “stepping into the traditional provider role” and declining to marry
the fathers of their children “has played out once before in American culture,”
her historical reference is to sociologist William Julius Wilson’s When Work
Disappears.274 Wilson’s book described the decline of manufacturing jobs for
black men, beginning in the 1970s, and the consequences for family life and
Than Women. And It Works Better for Richer Than for Poorer.
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marriage.275 At the same time, by using the term “nascent middle-class
matriarchy” to refer to gender dynamics among older, married, middle-class
couples, Rosin extends the use of the term.276
Beginning with the unmarried, younger couples, Rosin sketches profiles of
working-class women struggling valiantly to better themselves, care for their
children, and pursue the American dream, while the men in their lives seem to
be a net drain. The opening pages of her book refer to Bethenny and Calvin,
who have a ten-year-old daughter.277 When Rosin encounters Bethenny by
chance in a supermarket and asks her if she wants to marry, Bethenny looks at
her daughter, to whom she tosses a granola bar, and laughs: “Well, there’s
Calvin . . . . But Calvin would just mean one less granola bar for the two of
us.”278 Rosin interprets the laugh as an indicator of empowerment: far from
being a “pitiable single mother,” Bethenny, “[b]y keeping Calvin at arm’s
length [] could remain queen of her castle, and with one less mouth to feed,”
she and her daughter “might both be better off.”279
Women in Rosin’s portraits adapt and adjust to changing economic
circumstances (hence, her term “Plastic Woman”); men, in contrast, remain
stuck in the past, still hoping that the jobs of yesteryear will return (“Cardboard
Man,” Rosin calls them, although something about being glued or stuck to the
spot might be more apt).280 One critical difference between her account and
that of Murray is that Rosin specifically focuses on such gender dynamics.
Part of why men are stuck is due to their conception of proper gender roles.
For example, one man profiled by Rosin, Troy, is fond of using the refrain,
“‘ain’t a man.’”281 This phrase is used not only to express pride in his female
partner, Shannon, but also to express what no man “would take [] from his
wife,” such as coming home from work late without an explanation.282 When,
for the fourth night, Shannon, who is the primary breadwinner and juggles
working at Walmart and as an exotic dancer with going to nursing school,
came home late, Troy “choked her until she passed out.”283 We are told that he
regarded this as his “darkest hour” and Rosin reports, without editorializing,
that “[t]o make it up to her, he bought her a choker with a really big silver
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heart to cover the bruise.”284 Troy seems to contribute little to the household.
He does, however, make their son laugh and manage to calm Shannon down.285
Troy says they have a “Jerry Springer relationship” with a lot of fighting over
“sex and work”: he complains about the infrequency of sex; Shannon
complains that he “never brings home a paycheck.”286 Troy cannot get over the
closing down of the Russell Athletic manufacturing plant. He “is living in his
father’s memory of the great days of Russell.”287 Shannon urges Troy to “[g]et
over it,” and stop living in the past.288
Rosin concludes the chapter with Shannon, in yet another effort to help Troy
move forward, driving him to the old site of the Russell factory, where a truck
trailer is “sunk into the earth.”289 Displayed on the trailer is “an enormous
painting of a football player in full uniform running with the ball tucked in his
hands, next to the words RUSSELL. THE EXPERIENCE SHOWS.”290 Rosin
sees this as “depressing,” a “mockery of imminent victory,” 291 and we assume
Shannon does too. Troy, however, “doesn’t register that emotion.”292 Instead,
he responds by jokingly assuming a football pose and tackles her to the
ground, “where both of them fall, for the moment, laughing.”293 What happens
next we are not told.
A fascinating examination of gender dynamics and role negotiation within
marriage is showcased in Rosin’s portraits of somewhat older, married couples
in which the woman is now the primary earner and the man is newly under- or
unemployed. These are the couples profiled in her New York Times Magazine
cover story.294 The story begins with the teaser: “Welcome to the new middleclass matriarchy.”295 Compared to Shannon and Troy, the couples featured in
this story are more solidly middle class, but the husbands experienced a
reversal of fortune in the recession and the wives became the primary
breadwinners. Instead of engaging in violent choking followed by choker
necklaces, these men look beaten down themselves. In the remarkable photos
accompanying this story, the poses are of women putting their arms around
their men. In two photos, the husbands sit in chairs while their wives stand
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next to or behind them with an arm around their shoulder.296 In another, the
husband stands with hands in his pockets while his wife holds onto his arm as
if propping him up.297
These couples cope with a gender ideology, often rooted in the teachings of
their Christian religion, that the man is the head of the household and that an
essential feature of manhood is providing for wife and family.298 Wives,
according to this religious worldview, should graciously submit to their
husbands.299 Murray, as I discuss below, also stresses “religiosity” as being
among the founding virtues. “Like everyone of their generation I spoke to,”
Rosin observes of one featured couple, “Charles and Sarah Beth Gettys both
insisted that Charles was still the ‘head of the household.’”300 Charles,
formerly head of national sales for the fabrics division of Russell, had left that
job in 2003 when he saw his position would not last much longer, and then had
a brief, unsuccessful foray into starting a construction business.301 Meanwhile,
Sarah, who had always worked as a nurse, but only to earn “fun money” for the
family, steadily rose up the ranks as her hospital employer grew, eventually
becoming vice president in charge of patient services and the family’s primary
breadwinner.302
When Rosin pressed couples as to why men “got to retain their title if they
weren’t fulfilling most of the attending duties,” some answered in terms of
“redefining ‘head’ as ‘spiritual head,’ meaning biblically ordained as
leader.”303 Further, men could be protectors and rescuers even if they weren’t
primary earners, or earning at all: “[I]f someone broke into the house, if the
children were in trouble or out of control, if the roof caved in, if there was a
tornado, if we need him, he would rescue us.”304 Sarah Beth asks her Sunday
school class of high school girls to reflect on “what being ‘submissive’ means
in today’s world,” while another wife “sometimes used the word ‘submissive’
but usually put it in air quotes.”305 These portraits suggest that even if women
“wear the pants,” they are still invested in helping men feel that they are the
“leaders” of the family.
These stories also indicate that in addition to structural obstacles traceable to
the current recession, such as a loss of manufacturing jobs, men confront
obstacles due to conceptions of masculinity that hinder their ability to adapt to
296
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the new economy. Rosin captures this with her repeated imagery of men being
stuck, a metaphor in sharp contrast with women’s plasticity and adaptability,
including their ability to adapt to new gender roles. For example, why don’t
men take advantage of opportunities to shift to the types of jobs for which
there will be continuing demand in a post-industrial economy? In the New York
Times Magazine story, one husband, Reuben, explains why he could not train
for one of the jobs that he knew was available: “‘We’re in the South’ . . . . ‘A
man needs a strong macho job. He’s not going to be a schoolteacher or a legal
secretary or some beauty-shop queen. He’s got to be a man.’”306 Another, Rob,
was struggling to get his network consultant business going after his position
as a network analyst at Russell was phased out. His self-image is as the family
provider and “the man of the house,” despite the fact that his wife Connie is
providing the “dependable salary.”307 He explains that he has internalized the
ideal of man as provider, adding: “It’s like, if I can’t take care of her, then I’m
not a man.”308 Comic relief from this dilemma arrives in the form of comments
by Connie’s daughter from her first marriage, who proclaims that Rob’s ideas
about marriage are “so cute, it’s gross,” and finds “this Southern code of
chivalry” to be “nonsense,” out of sync with how the “boys she knew actually
behaved – hanging out in the parking lot, doing God knows what, or going
home and playing video games instead of bothering to apply for college.”309
In contrast to these older women, who often assumed primary breadwinner
roles after their husbands experienced a reversal of fortune, many of the
younger women Rosin profiles feel little obligation to shore up or bolster their
male partner. Here Rosin’s portraits of male haplessness and irresponsibility
are quite vivid. In a later chapter of her book, “Pharm Girls,” Rosin profiles
Hannah, one of the growing number of women going to pharmacy school as a
path to upward mobility.310 Hannah’s boyfriend is Billy, an underemployed
painter who often goes fishing with his buddies, who “are also underworked
this year.”311 Rosin captures Hannah’s exasperation with Billy and his apparent
refusal to better himself. One telling example of their conflict is over television
preferences: she favors documentaries and educational shows; he favors
Comedy Central.312 The chapter ends with Billy turning the television to the
movie Jackass 3D. Hannah “rolls her eyes because, she says, those jackasses
do the same exact thing, year after year. ‘What’s wrong with that?’ says
Billy.”313 What holds Billy back? Once again, Cardboard Man fails to adapt to
new economic realities. While Hannah is emblematic of women who see the
306
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value of professional training as a pathway to a lucrative profession, Billy is
emblematic of men who do not pursue such education. Rosin attributes this
failure by “Cardboard Man” in part to the problem that “the range of
acceptable masculine roles has changed comparatively little,” and has even
narrowed as men “shy away from some careers as women begin to dominate
them.”314
Rosin concludes the book on a somewhat hopeful note. Calvin, on whom
Bethenny was reluctant to expend a granola bar, is enrolling in the nursing
program Bethenny just completed, willing to give it a try “even though the
classes looked like ‘all skirts’ to him.”315 Higher on the economic ladder
herself, Rosin indicates that her research has led to personal reflection. She
writes: “[It has] caused me to start raising my own two sons differently. Even
if it’s against their ‘nature,’ I want to teach them to bend.”316 And she adds that
“[t]o my relief, I’ve discovered that with a little creativity on all our parts, it’s
not all that hard.”317
In sum, Rosin’s book offers rich material on certain aspects of the other
marriage equality problem. Missing from her analysis, however, is
consideration of the impact of the so-called “new American matriarchy” for
children, or the “reproduction of disadvantage” problem. As Naomi Cahn and
June Carbone observe in their contribution to this Symposium, “[w]hile Rosin
paints a cheery picture of single mothers preferring to make it on their own,
their children are falling further behind the children in two-parent families
whose combined resources offer greater advantages.”318 Moreover, Rosin does
not attend much to the impact of the marriage divide on the capacity of
neighborhoods and communities in which these comparatively disadvantaged
families live to support social reproduction.
IV. CHARLES MURRAY: THE MARRIAGE DIVIDE THREATENS AMERICAN
EXCEPTIONALISM
In his book, Coming Apart: The State of White America, 1960-2010, Murray
worries a great deal about the implications of the marriage divide for social
reproduction. He suggests certain demographic trends “call[] into question the
viability of white working-class communities as a place for socializing the next
generation.”319 He contends that American exceptionalism has rested in
America’s community life: “The founding virtues operating under the
freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution produced an American civic culture
that was unique in all the world. . . . All observers [(among them Alexis de
Tocqueville)] agreed that community life in the United States was unlike
314
315
316
317
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community life anywhere else.”320 Murray identifies the four core values, or
“founding virtues,” upon which America rests as marriage, industriousness,
honesty, and religiosity.321 These virtues work together and their decline
causes social capital to deteriorate: “The empirical relationships that exist
among marriage, industriousness, honesty, religiosity, and a self-governing
society mean that the damage is done, even though no one intends it.”322 Thus,
the sorting of America into a “new upper class” and a “new lower class”
portends the “selective collapse” of American community, and thus, of
American exceptionalism.323
Men are the primary culprits, as Murray tells the tale. They are less
industrious, less responsible, and less likely to marry the mothers of their
children. Thus, the rise in male irresponsibility has serious implications for the
very stability of civil society and, ultimately, of the political order.324
A.

The Marriage Divide Between the New Upper Class and the Rest of
America

How does Murray evaluate the growing marriage divide and its impact on
children? Like Rosin, he devotes chapters to both sides of the divide. The story
he tells about the marriage “haves,” so to speak, is of assortative mating, or
what Murray calls “cognitive homogamy”: the most highly educated people
marry each other and live in elite communities, or “super zip codes,”
segregated from other social classes.325 To be sure, “before the age of
mobility,” there was some homogamy – “people commonly married someone
from the same town or from the same neighborhood of an urban area” – but
whether there was “cognitive homogamy” was more “haphazard.”326 Today,
even college graduates sort themselves; those “from elite colleges are likely to
marry other graduates from elite colleges.”327 Murray, whose prior work, The
Bell Curve, includes a controversial examination of intelligence,328 asserts that
these parents, graduates of elite institutions, transmit cognitive ability to the
next generation, which helps the elite “maintain[] its status across
generations.”329 Genetics alone does not do the entire job, however; Murray
also stresses how the new upper class grooms its children for success.330
320
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In this “new kind of segregation,” the new upper class lives apart and
differently from the rest of America.331 Similar to the State of Our Unions
2012 report discussed above, Murray’s book contrasts the growing divide
between the lives of the upper class and those of the rest of America with what
happened in an earlier era. He explains these trends, and what has happened to
the founding virtues from 1960 to 2000, by describing two “fictional
neighborhoods,” Belmont and Fishtown.332 Thus, in places like Belmont, an
upper-class neighborhood, one infers that the founding virtues of marriage,
responsibility, honesty, and industriousness continue to flourish. By contrast,
although those same virtues flourished in Fishtown during the 1960s, when it
was a white working-class neighborhood, today there is a stark divide and
Fishtown exemplifies the new lower class.333
In his survey of the decline of the virtues, Murray begins with “class
divergence in marriage” because, “[o]ver the last half century, marriage has
become the fault line dividing American classes.”334 Formerly, even though the
wealthy differed from the middle and working class because they were, well,
wealthier, the patterns of family and community life among the wealthy
differed little from that of the middle and working class: marriage, responsible
parenting, civic engagement, and the like.335 Now, by contrast, the white
middle class – particularly the working class or moderately educated middle
class – is “coming apart” at the seams: nonmarital births have become the
norm. The new upper class, meanwhile, does not repudiate marriage. Marital
births are the norm, albeit often after a protracted investment in the human
capital of young adults.336 In its model of investment, this story is consistent
with McLanahan’s picture of “diverging destinies.” Murray illustrates this
divergence in his portraits of the real Belmont and Fishtown. He reports data
showing that from 1997 to 2004, ninety percent of children in the real Belmont
were living with both biological parents when the mother turned forty. In the
real Fishtown the number was “sinking below the 30 percent level.”337 Murray
is, how to make the baby smarter, where the baby should go to preschool, and where the
baby should go to law school,” and remarking that “one of the major preoccupations of
upper-class parents during their children’s teenage years, the college admissions process, is
almost entirely absent in mainstream America”).
331 Id. at 69.
332 Murray first describes the real town of Belmont and then, for the purposes of
highlighting class differences among communities, creates a fictionalized town of Belmont
that is even more homogenous in terms of income and marital status than the real town. See
id. at 144-45. The fictional Fishtown represents the “new lower class.” Id. at 144. Murray
first describes the real Fishtown, and then the fictional Fishtown, which allows him to
display the class differences in starker terms. Id. at 145-46.
333 Murray details this decline in separate chapters on the four virtues. Id. at 149-208.
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identifies a shift in norms about marriage as the expected site for parenthood,
suggesting, consistent with McLanahan, the declining hold of the shotgun
wedding. While “the traditional norm in Fishtown had not necessarily been
‘get married and then get pregnant and have a baby,’” “[q]uite frequently, it
had been ‘get pregnant, then get married and have a baby.’”338 A “drastic” shift
from either of these norms was evident even by the mid-1980s, however, when
more high school-age girls were getting pregnant and not marrying.339 Murray
considers the reasons for this shift, rejecting “lack of information about family
planning.”340 Instead, he suggests a mixture of pregnancies that “just
happened,” but were not, in contrast to past practice, “followed by marriage”;
pregnancies that were wanted in order to achieve status by having a baby; and
“pregnancies . . . welcomed as a way to get out of the house,” to move in with
a boyfriend, or to go on welfare.341
B.

Irresponsible Men, Unmarried Mothers, and the Decline of Social Capital

Some attention to Murray’s critique of male irresponsibility as a falling
away from the founding virtues will afford a useful comparison with Rosin. In
the chapter “The Real Fishtown,” Murray steps back from telling the story of
the new (white) lower-class neighborhoods through statistics and begins to
describe actual people in an actual town. The basic motif is one of “many adult
men in a community [] living off relatives or girlfriends,” which results in
placing “lots of stress on the community.”342 He considers the decline in male
“industriousness” and of townspeople describing men “who just couldn’t seem
to cope with the process of getting and holding a job.”343 The problem for
family structure is that unmarried men who father children may be “nice” guys
who are “sorry,” but for the most part, they do not “end up being fathers to
their children.”344 Murray asserts: “Children need fathers, and the next
generation in a community with lots of children without fathers is in
trouble.”345 This problem contributes to the decline of social capital.
Why marriage matters, Murray argues, pertains not just to the organization
of communities, but also because of the “socialization of the next
generation.”346 He contends that “the family structure that produces the best
outcomes for children, on average, are two biological parents who remain
married.”347 “Never-married women,” he reports, “produce the worst
338
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outcomes.”348 With this metric, then, the decline of marriage and the
“collapse” of the family in places like Fishtown is dire because “[f]amilies
with children are the core around which American communities must be
organized” because they “have always been, and still are, the engine that
makes American communities work.”349
Murray also stresses the diverging destinies of the Belmonts and Fishtowns
of America from 1960 to 2010 with respect to the virtue of industriousness
among white men.350 Men in Fishtown, for example, lack work because they
lack industriousness, not because of the disappearance of jobs.351 He reports
comments by Fishtown residents that young men just “don’t have the
ambition,” that they have male role models who are “not working or on
unemployment,” and that they simply “ha[ve] no interest in holding a job or
having a family.”352 Murray is also suspicious of the rising rate of disability
among men, suggesting they learn to get by on disability income while
working “under the table.”353 Men also “live off” women who receive welfare
payments.354 We learn that “such men are known as ‘runners’ or ‘fly by
nights,’ because they are constantly on the move, avoiding debt collectors,
child support collectors, their girlfriends or children, or the police. They, too,
are active in the drug trade, which exploded” in Fishtown in the 1980s.355
His bottom-line measure, whether a household has “someone working at
least forty hours a week,” reveals a marked downward trend: in 1960, 81% of
Fishtown households and 90% of Belmont households met this barometer; by
March 2012 the qualifying Fishtown households had dropped to 53% while
Belmont households only experienced a 3% decline, to 87%.356
Critics of Murray challenge his diagnosis of male unemployment as a moral
problem – the deterioration of virtue – rather than as a result of the deep
recession and structural economic problems disproportionately affecting
working-class men.357 The interplay between personal and public
responsibility, or between personal choices and economic constraints, is
important because an emphasis on the loss of virtue cries out for cultural
solutions, while an emphasis on economic structures calls out for economic
348
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policy. The gender dynamic that Murray finds in both real and fictional
Fishtown is similar to that which Rosin reports: men are often a net drain on
the women with whom they share children. While Rosin tends to stress the
energy, drive, and determination of the women she profiles, however, the
women in Murray’s account do not escape blame for moral failings. In
discussing the increasing number of teenage females in Fishtown getting
pregnant, Murray reports a school teacher’s view that “not knowing how to be
mothers is a big problem,” as such young mothers “‘want to “do” for their kids
but do not know how.’”358 Often, siblings take care of siblings and children
learn “how to take care of themselves.”359 Also, grandparents are often raising
their grandchildren.360 In a passage all too reminiscent of some of the rhetoric
from the 1990s about the type of mothers who received Aid to Families with
Dependent Children benefits, Murray comments:
Alongside the women who didn’t get married but are trying hard to be
good mothers are those who are the horror stories that workers in the
child protective services exchange – mothers who use three-year-olds to
babysit for infants while they go out for the evening; homes where the
children are brain damaged because the latest live-in boyfriend makes
meth in the kitchen sink; and the many cases of outright physical and
emotional abuse by never-married women who are not just overburdened
mothers but irresponsible or incompetent ones.361
One significant difference between Murray’s portrait of irresponsible
mothers and the horror stories told by Congressmen in the 1990s is that, for
many of its critics in those debates, the “color of welfare”362 was black.
Murray’s stories, by contrast, are about the failings of the new white American
lower class and the “selective collapse” of American community.363
Similar to Murray’s indictment of men for their employment, Murray
diagnoses a falling away from marriage in terms of a loss of virtue. He fails to
consider the interplay of culture and economics in the class-based gap between
marital aspirations and practices among the marriage have nots. For this
reason, he fails to consider how public policy might address that gap.364
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Gender Dynamics and Gender Roles in the New Upper Class

How do gender dynamics look, in comparison, in the family lives of the new
elites living in their super-zip-code neighborhoods? Murray disappoints on this
question, perhaps because he does not devote a parallel chapter to lives in the
real Belmont. He begins with an interesting survey revealing the chronological
shift in women’s attitudes about marriage, family, and career from 1960 to
2010. Thus, Murray recounts a 1962 Gallup poll, commissioned by the
Saturday Evening Post, which found that ninety-six percent of wives surveyed
believed that a “‘girl who is married and has a family to raise’” is happier than
“‘the unmarried career girl,’” and ninety-three percent of those wives “said that
they did not, in retrospect, wish they had pursued a career instead of getting
married.”365 Unsurprising for that time, most married women said that between
the ages of twenty and twenty-three was the ideal time for women to marry,
with a mere eighteen percent believing a woman “should wait until age 25 or
older.”366 Married women strongly endorsed the norm of fidelity for husbands
and wives. Another contemporaneous poll, taken before states adopted no-fault
divorce laws, found that a strong majority of people thought divorce should be
made more difficult.367
With that as a baseline, Murray charts shifts in attitudes about “the woman’s
role in marriage.”368 One graph shows a sharp decline, from 1977 through the
1980s, in the percentage of whites aged thirty to forty-nine who agreed with
the statement that “women should tend the family.”369 Although “[t]he
traditional conception of marital roles took a big hit,” a “substantial class
difference remained”: by the 2000s, “almost 40 percent of Fishtown still took a
traditional view of the woman’s role, compared to less than 20 percent of
Belmont.”370 This higher degree of acceptance of women’s changed roles
seems to fit Murray’s account of assortative mating among the new upper
class. Murray, however, does not flesh this data out with portraits of the
dynamics in the marriages, or nonmarital relationships, of citizens in the
different towns. In his later chapter on industriousness, he reports that “married
women in Belmont and Fishtown behaved similarly,” as part of the
“revolution” of married women’s increased participation in the labor force.371
With respect to unmarried women, he finds an “already wide” gap in 1960,
with more than ninety percent of college-educated unmarried women in the
labor force, compared with a peak rate of eighty-three percent in 1983 for
unmarried women with a high school education.372 Murray does not, however,
365
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offer a satisfactory analysis of this gap, instead presenting data without
exploring the stories behind those data.
Murray also reports differences in divorce rates between the towns, with
similar trajectories until the early 1980s, when the “trendline in Belmont
flattened” while the trendline in Fishtown “continued steeply upward.”373
Similarly, the number of married couples that self-reported being “very happy”
in their marriages seems to have steadily declined in Fishtown, while it has
been arcing up in Belmont since the 1980s.374
Religiosity offers a more complicated picture than a stark class divide.
America still is “exceptional” as compared with “other advanced countries” in
terms of the percentage of white Americans who are “actively religious.”375
Thus, while Murray’s data challenge the “conventional wisdom that workingclass white America is still staunchly religious while white American elites are
dominated by secular humanists,” he cannot paint a picture of an intensely
religious, hence virtue-drenched, Belmont and an irreligious, hence virtuelacking, Fishtown.376 Secularization is widespread. Nonetheless, he does find a
higher percentage of religiously disengaged in Fishtown (59%) than in
Belmont (41%).377 His basic claim here is that, to the extent that “religion” is
“one of the key sources of social capital in a community,” if a town has more
active churchgoers, it will have more people to serve not only in the church but
also in that community’s various charitable activities.378
CONCLUSION
In this Article I have argued for giving attention to “the other marriage
equality problem,” the growing class-based divide in the United States with
respect to paths to family formation. I have argued that warnings about
growing family inequality and its implications for children warrant attention.
My point of departure was contrasting portraits in the media of what is
happening to marriage. One portrait is of marriage “haves” and “have nots,”
with things going well for people who follow a course of investing in their
education before marrying and becoming parents, and whose children then
benefit from the parental investment of two parents, and with things going less
well for people who depart from that script. Another portrait suggested
resistance to the idea that marriage should be the marker of the good life and of
responsible citizenship, championing those who remain single, and childless,
as being happy and as contributing greatly to civil society. To analyze the other
marriage equality problem, I used as foils Hanna Rosin’s diagnosis of the “end
of men and the rise of women” and Charles Murray’s account of the marriage
373
374
375
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divide as part of the class-based “selective collapse of American community.”
I also argued that Rosin’s account highlights that one aspect of the other
marriage equality problem is gender equality: how men and women understand
and navigate gender roles in marital and nonmarital relationships, particularly
in changing economic circumstances.
This Article also situated contemporary debates about what is happening to
marriage in the context of periods of earlier concerns about marriage. During
congressional debates about welfare reform and, later, the reauthorization of
TANF, lawmakers paid keen attention to the separation of marriage and
parenthood among low-income men and women and their “fragile families”
and to an evident gap between marital aspirations and marital practice. Turning
to more recent reports on the marriage divide, I highlighted a parallel concern
over a gap between marital aspiration and practice and the separation of
marriage and parenthood in a growing segment of Middle America.
The other marriage equality problem concerns both the ability of adults to
act on their aspirations for their intimate relationships and the impact upon
children of growing family inequality in the United States. Both of these
dimensions of the marriage equality problem are matters within the concern of
family law and policy. Federal administrative and legislative responses are also
appropriate. As McLanahan argued, drawing analogies to policies instituted
during the New Deal era, broader public policies should address the
consequences of broad demographic changes in patterns of family life. The
formative project of constitutional liberalism could properly support efforts to
address family inequality. The scope of such efforts should go beyond family
policy, narrowly conceived. Thus, in recent work, McLanahan and her Fragile
Families colleague Irwin Garfinkel propose a range of policies investing in
children and adults.379 Direct and indirect investments in children would
include such policies as providing national health insurance, universal prekindergarten, and paid parental leave; investments in parents would include, in
addition to paid parental leave, revisiting unrealistic child support-obligations
imposed on low-income fathers, instituting child-support assurance, marriage
and fatherhood programs focused on relationships skills, and reducing mass
incarceration.380 McLanahan and Garfinkel sensibly argue that investing in
“the human capital and the economic and social security of children in fragile
families” is likely to “reduce the future prevalence of fragile families,” noting
that “[e]ducational attainment – a critical element of human capital – is not
only a strong predictor of earnings, but is also one of the strongest predictors of
marriage and family stability.”381 Finally, they call for educational and
379
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healthcare programs aimed at reducing the incidence of unintended pregnancy
and early childbearing, including programs encouraging children and young
people, across class lines, to delay forming a family “until they have found a
partner with whom they can form a stable union.”382
There are, of course, difficult normative and empirical questions. On the one
hand, the fact that marriage is in “decline” may be welcome evidence of a
loosening up of scripts about what forms adult intimate life and family life can
take. On this view, perhaps it is a good thing that some people think marriage
is obsolete or no longer the chief marker of a fulfilling life. Elsewhere, I have
articulated support, for example, for a diversity approach to family life and to
parenthood, consonant with family law’s recognition of the growing diversity
in family life.383 On the other hand, evidence that most Americans share an
aspiration toward a happy marriage, but that there is a class-based gap in
whether they achieve that goal, suggests that marriage is not obsolete, for
many people, but instead perceived to be out of reach. Further, when inequality
among families also entails inequality among children, this creates concerns
about social reproduction. McLanahan and Garfinkel, for example, conclude
that “[f]ragile families are both a consequence and a cause of economic
disadvantage.”384
To be sure, studies of child outcomes caution against assuming that a
particular family form, as such, is the guarantor of child wellbeing. Instead,
what matters most seems to be the quality of the parent-child relationship,
access to social and economic resources, and the place of families in their
broader communities.385 Nonetheless, child poverty is a factor that shapes
children’s lives and opportunities and single-parent families, generally, are
more likely to be poor than two-parent families. Moreover, while children may
fare well in stable single-parent households, household instability that results
from the complex family patterns that arise as many unmarried mothers and
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fathers dissolve their relationships and form new partnerships has negative
consequences for children and their parents.386
At the same time, discussions about the consequences for children of the
growing class divide need to be attentive to the risk of a new model of
parenting and family life where only the most affluent and advantaged parents
pass muster and the less advantaged and affluent doom their children to an
inferior life. For example, some responses to Jason DeParle’s portrait of the
two white mothers, Jessica (single) and Chris (married), as emblematic of two
classes, “divided by ‘I do,’” criticized the story as “moralizing” against single
mothers and as suggesting that Jessica’s children were “suffering because of a
lack of extracurricular activities,” which would somehow doom them to
becoming “dropouts and teenage parents.”387 Instead, critics argued, why not
look at the resourcefulness of mothers like Jessica, whose own parenting
philosophy is that parental involvement (whether there is one parent or two)
will help children feel that they “can do whatever it is they want to do, whether
they come from a family with money or a family with not much money.”388 An
issue deserving further attention in consideration of the social reproduction of
advantage – and disadvantage – is how class shapes models of parenting and
what parents believe they should do for their children to prepare them for
success in life.389
I will conclude by observing an irony. Back in the 1990s, when Congress
debated welfare reform and politicians indicted the welfare poor as out of
touch with core American values of family, work, and responsibility, some
politicians and conservatives laid some of the blame at the door of babyboomer liberals, whom they viewed as being elitist, self-indulgent, and
themselves out of touch with mainstream American values. Pundits charged
that baby boomers’ war against traditional values had trickled down to the
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poor, with disastrous consequences, since the poor had less to fall back on.390
That is why, for example, Murphy Brown was so dangerous as a role model.
Twenty years later, pundits like Murray now lament that the white middle class
and working class have fallen away from traditional family values and the
founding virtues; the college-educated elites, meanwhile, embrace virtues of
marriage and industriousness and are the ones with more stable marriages, low
divorce rates, and low rates of nonmarital births. That elite, he argues, should
be more willing to preach the founding virtues to the rest of America, but they
do not. McLanahan puts this in a less inflammatory way in her caution about
diverging destinies: how can public policy encourage lower-income men and
women to accept the behaviors of those in the top income quartile, so that they
“delay childbearing, invest in education and training, and form stable
partnerships” before having children?391 In addition, how can public policy
encourage men from disadvantaged backgrounds to “remain committed to their
children?”392
Murray’s indictment of a broad swath of Americans for their decline in
virtue also brings us back to the perennial debates about the interplay of
personal and public responsibility; or the respective roles of character, culture,
and structural barriers to equality and opportunity. Rosin’s diagnoses raise
similar questions. Is there economic opportunity for the hapless men Murray
and Rosin describe if they would just grasp it? Are gender conventions holding
men hostage so that they, unlike women, simply cannot grow, evolve, and
adapt? Or are there bigger structural barriers that would remain even if men
were willing to become more like women? What about social or cultural
obstacles to accepting more women as family breadwinners and finding an
approach to work-family conflict that accommodates that role? I have argued
that one dimension of the other marriage equality problem is negotiating
gender roles and gender equality within marital and nonmarital relationships.
The tensions Rosin found in her couples over women’s changing family roles
seem mirrored in the broader society. Public opinion surveys suggest that, as a
record forty percent of American families now have women as the primary
390
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breadwinners, the public is “conflicted.”393 On the one hand, the “vast
majority,” seventy-nine percent, of those surveyed do not believe that women
should “return to their traditional roles.”394 On the other hand, fifty-one percent
believe “children are better off if a mother is home and doesn’t hold a job;”
only a minimal percent say the same thing about a father.395 Moreover, the
prevailing public opinion is that having females as breadwinners makes it
easier for families to live comfortably, but it also makes it more difficult to
have successful marriages and raise children.396 Clearly, there is unfinished
business on this issue.
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